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In the SupreiDe Court of the 
State of Utah 
MAUDE COX PE.TERSON, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
JOSEPH NIELSON, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
CASE 
NO. 8605 
Brief of Plaintiff and Appellant, 
Maude Cox Peterson 
PRELUKINARY STATEMENT 
This appeal is taken from the judgment of the District 
Court of Sanpete County, sitting without a jury, the Hon-
orable L. Leland L·arson, presiding. The subject matter 
of this case arises from a collision between an automobile 
driven by appellant, with a pickup truck driven by respond-
ent, at the junction of U. S. Highway 89 with a county 
road known as Shumway Road. The trial court found that 
the collision was caused by the concurring negligence of 
defendant and plaintiff, and denied recovery upon plain-
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tiff's complaint, and upon defendant's counterclaim. From 
the judgment of the trial court denying plaintiff's right of 
re-covery this appeal is taken. In appellant's Statement of 
Facts, direct reference will be made to the record, in those 
cases where we believe the facts are supported by the evi-
dence. Where we believe claimed facts are not supported 
by the evidence, reference will be made to the transcript. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
U. S. Highv;ay 89 is an arterial highway and extends 
in a general north and south direction between Ephraim, 
Utah, and Manti, Utah (R. 35). Approximately 1.1 mile 
south of Ephraim, Utah, a public road known as Shumway 
Road, extends in an east and west direction, enters U. S. 
Highway 89 from the west (R. 34, 35). At the junction of 
U. S. Highway 89 and Shumway Road, U. S. Highway 89 
is hard surfaced with a good grade of asphalt 18 feet in 
width, and has shoulders extending 5 or 6 feet on either 
side (R. 35). Shumway Road is a graveled road 26 feet 
in width. There is a stop sign on Shumway Road approxi-
mately 39 feet west of the west edge of the asphalt sur-
face of U. S. Highway 89 (R. 35). 
On April 5, 1955, at appro~imately 5:15 o'clock p. m., 
plaintiff was driving her 1955 model red-bodied DeSoto 
automobile south on U. S. Highway 89, at a speed of ap--
proximately 50 to 52 miles per hour (Tr. 23, 75). When 
plaintiff was 'between 1000 and 900 feet north of the junc-
tion of Shumway Road, she observed defendant's truck 
proceeding easterly on Shumway Road (R. 36). Plain-
tiff applie~ her brakes, thereby decreasing the speed of 
her automobile, and continued to do so until defendant's 
truck stopped near the west edge of the paved portion of 
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U. S. Highway 89, at which time plaintiff was between 400 
~d 500 feet north of defendant's truck (R. 36, Tr. 24). 
Plaintiff kept defendant's truck in view at all times from 
the ti·me she first observed it until defendant's truck 
stopped (Tr. 57, 58). After plaintiff observed defendant's 
truck stop, she then resumed her speed (R. 36,) of ap-
proxi·mately 50 miles per hour (Tr. 69). Although de-
fendant proceeded past the stop sign without stopping, he 
did come to a complete stop about 6 to 10 feet west of the 
west edge of the paved portion of U. S. Highway 89 (R. 
36). During the same time, a car driven by Yvonne Hol-
brook was traveling north in the north bound lane on ,U. 
S. Highway 89, followed by a heavily loaded truck driven 
by Elliott Johnson (R. 36). The Holbrook car passed the 
plaintiff's car going in opposite directions on U. S. High-
way 89 at a point approximately 75 feet to 100 feet north 
of the entrance of Shumway Road (R. 36). At the same 
time the truck driven by Elliott Johnson was at a point 
approximately 15/100 mile (792 feet) south of the entrance 
of Shumway RJoad (R. 36). Plaintiff observed someone 
(defendant) in defendant's trucK: when defendant stopped, 
but she could not ascertain in which direction he was look-
ing (Tr. 39, 40). When plaintiff was 50 to 75 feet north 
of the entrance to Shumway Road, defendant drove his 
truck into the south bound lane of U. S. Highway 89 di-
rectly into the path of plaintiff's car (Tr. 27). The speed 
of plaintiff's car immediately prior to the collision was 
approximately 50 miles per hour (Tr. 69). Plaintiff im-
mediately applied the brakes on her automobile (R. 36, 
Tr. 27). Plaintiff's car left tire skid marks on the high-
way for a distance af 41 to 45 feet to a point at which the 
plaintiff's car struck the defendant's truck (R. 36). The 
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front wheels of defendant's truck were on the paved por-
tion of U. S. Highway 89, three feet east of the west edge 
thereof when the collision occurred (R. 36, 37). The im-
pact caused plaintiff's ~ar to veer to the left on U. S. High-
way 89, and left tire skid marks on said highway for a 
distance of 57 to 64 feet from the point of impact to its 
place of rest (R. 37). The force of the impact injured plain-
tiff, and substantially damaged her car (R. 37). Defend-
ant was also injured and his truck was substantially dam-
aged (R. 37). Plaintiff did not at any time prior to the 
collision sound her horn (R. 37). The brakes on plain-
tiff's automobile were good, the road was dry, it was day-
light, and the weather was clear (R. 36). From the time 
plaintiff first saw defendant and from the time defendant 
stopped near the paved portion of U. S. Highway 89 the 
view of both plaintiff and defendant were unobstructed 
(R. 36). 
On the basis of these facts, the trial court found plain-
tiff negligent and that her negligence contributed to, and 
was a part of the proximate cause of her injuries and dam-
age to her automobile. Appellant contends that the judg-
ment of the trial court in this respect is erroneous, and 
hereby seeks a reversal thereof. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THERE IS NO COMPETENT EVIDENCE TO SUP-
FORT A FINDING THAT THE PLAIN'TIF'F' WAS TRAV-
ELING AT A RATE OF SPEED IN EXCESS OF 60 
MILES PER HOUR AT THE TIME DEFENDANT 
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DROVE HIS TRUCK ONTO U. S. HIGHWAY 89, INTO 
THE PATH OF PLAINTIFF'S CAR. 
We are mindful of the principle that if there is any 
competent evidence to support the findings of the trial 
court, such findings will not be disturbed by this Court 
on appeal. We have made a careful search of the record 
and can find no competent evidence to support a finding 
that plaintiff was at any time material herein, traveling 
at a rate of speed in excess of 52 miles per hour. Plain-
tiff testified that her speed was around 50 miles per hour, 
just as she left Ephraim, Utah (Tr. 23). This was coT-
roborated by the testimony of Wallace Tatton, a disinter-
ested witness who was driving a truck south on U. S. High-
way 89, just south of the city limits of Ephraim, Utah, when 
plaintiff passed him (Tr. 74). When plaintiff passed Mr. 
Tatton, his speed was approximately 40 'miles per hour, 
and it was his judgment that plaintiff was going 10 to 12 
miles per hour faster (Tr. 75). The plaintiff testified that 
after she slowed down and defendant stopped, and she re-
sumed her speed, she did not exceed her previous speed 
of 50 miles per hour (Tr. 69). This was again corroborated 
by the testimony of Wallace Tatton, who testified that after 
plaintiff had passed him, she did not accelerate or gain 
greater speed than when she was passing him (Tr. 75). 
Plaintiff unequivocally testified that her speed was around 
50 miles per hour just prior to the impact (Tr. 69) . 
There were only four other witnesses who were in 
viewing distance of the collision at the time it happened. 
Those persons were the defendant, Joseph Nielson, Yvonne 
Holbrook, Eliott Johnson, and Etta Johnson. The defend-
ant, Joseph Nielson, could make no observation of plain-
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tiff's speed, since he didn't even see plaintiff's car (Tr. 286, 
291, 333). The witness Yvonne HJollbrook observed plain-
tiff's car approaching on U. S. Highway 89, but she gave 
no testimony with respect to the speed of plaintiff's car. 
The witness, Elliott Johnson, who observed the collision 
(Tr. 121) was driving a heavily loaded truck north on U. 
S. Highway 89, and was south of Shumway Road 15/100 
of a mile (792 feet), at the time of the collision (R. 36, 
Tr. 126). He gave no testimony with respect to the speed 
of plaintiff's car. 
The witness Etta Johnson was a passenger in the front 
seat of the Holbrook automobile (Tr. 196). She gave no 
direct testimony of the speed of plaintiff's automobile. Her 
testimony was that she first observed plaintiff's automo-
bile when the Holbrook car was 200 feet south of Shum-
way Road (Tr. 197). She testified that at that moment 
the plaintiff's automobile was in the approximate location 
of the two white posts designated at points number 3 and 
4 of defendant's Exhibit Number 2, which she estimated to 
be 1000 feet north of Shum,way Road (Tr. 203). She then 
testified that the Holbrook automobile passed plaintiff's 
automobile when both automobiles were approximately 
150 to 200 feet north of Shumway Road (Tr. 198). Ap-
parently the defendant intended to establish by such tes-
timony that the plaintiff's automobile traveled a distance 
of 800 to 850 feet during the same interval of time which 
the Holbrook automobile traveled 350 to 400 feet. The 
Holbrook automobile during such interval, was traveling 
at a rate of 50 to 55 miles per hour (R. 35, Tr. 12, 203). 
A computation based upon the extremes of the foregoing, 
would indieate that the speed of plaintiff's automobile was 
between 100 to 133 miles per hour. Mrs. Johnson also 
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testified it could be that the plaintiff was going four times 
as fast as the Holbrook automobile, i. e. 200 to 220 miles 
per hour, which, of course, is preposterous (Tr. 203). 
Such inferences and statements by this witness are 
speculative and are solely based upon conjecture. It is 
clear from the record that her judgment and concept of 
distances are grossly exaggerated and erroneous. For ex-
ample, Mrs. Johnson testified that in her judgment it was 
200 feet from where she was sitting in the courtroom to 
a certain red brick house in front of which there was a 
new pickup truck (Tr. 207, 208). The same distance was 
paced off by a Deputy Sheriff, Park Miner, and was actu-
ally found to be in excess of 549 feet (Tr. 325). 
It is obvious that the testimony of Mrs. Johnson is 
based upon such gross misjudgment of distances that it 
would not be entitled to any weight whatsoever. Although 
we cannot tell with certainty what weight, if any, the trial 
court gave to her testimony, it appears that no credence 
was given it at all. This is apparent from the court making 
a finding that the Holbrook automobile and the plaintiff's 
automobile passed each other when the Holbrook automo-
bile was 75 to 100 feet north from defendant's truck ('R. 
36) . Mrs. Johnson testified to the very same distance as 
being 150 to 200 feet (Tr. 198). 
If, however, we are in error, and the findings of the 
trial court that plaintiff was traveling at a rate of speed 
in excess of 60 miles per hour was based upon the testi-
mony of Mrs. Johnson, we submit that such finding can-
not stand. Such a finding cannot be based on mere specu-
lation or conjecture, but must be based on the preponder-
ance of the evidence. Alvarado vs. Tucker, et al, 2 Utah 
2d 16, 268 P. 2d 986. There must be competent, credible 
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eVidence to support the findings made by the trial court. 
Jensen vs. Gerrard, 85 Utah 481, 39 P. 2d 1070; Buckley 
vs .Cox, 122 Utah 151, 247 P. 2d 277. The testimony of 
Mrs. Johnson could not by any stretch of the imagination 
be considered competent and credible. It was the duty of 
the trial court as the trier of the fact to ·completely dis-
regard such evidence. The only other testimony relating 
to the speed of plaintiff's automobile was that of Dr. H. 
Reed Christensen. The testimony of Dr. Christensen falls 
in the same category as that of Mrs. Johnson. The trial 
court permitted Dr. Christensen to give his opinion upon 
a hypothetical question supposedly encompassing the facts 
of this case. His opinion was that the speed of plaintiff's 
car was between 63 and 85 miles per hour. We presume 
that this opinion was the basis of the finding of the trial 
court that plaintiff was traveling at a speed in excess of 
60 miles per hour, since the record is devoid of any other 
evidence to support such a finding. 
We submit that the opinion of Dr. Christensen was 
incompetent, irrelevant, and immaterial, and it was error 
for the trial court . to admit such evidence over the objec-
tion of plaintiff, if such evidence were admitted. As a 
matter of fact, we are unable to determine from the rec-
ord whether the opinions of Dr. Christensen were even 
admitted as evidence. When the witness was asked for 
his opinion as to the speed of plaintiff's automobile prior 
to the impact, we strongly objected (Tr. 245, 246, 247, 248). 
In ruling on the objection, the trial court stated, "Well, 
I don't think he could get into any court hut this one." 
Then the court asked the witness for his opinion on how 
quick a car can stop that is traveling 50 miles per hour on 
an open highway under laid cement, assuming there was 
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no car in front of him, and no obstructions (Tr. 248). The 
witness answered, "Well, all I could do there is take what 
the State Engineer says", referring to the card marked 
Defendant's Exhibit 6 (Tr. 247). ,On page 249 of the tran-
script the court, acting as the interrogator, asked the wit-
ness, "What did you get on that? I won't accept it as 
evidence, hut I would like to hear you." We then moved 
that all of the testimony of D'r. Christensen be stricken 
(Tr. 256) . The trial court ruled, "I'm not going to admit 
it except for what it is worth." Again on page 257 of the 
transcript, the trial court stated, "I don't consider it a 
proper interrogatory under all the circumstances ..... 
I will just have to use it for its worth". On page 258 of 
the transcript, the court stated: "Well, I won't accept it 
as a hypothetical question at all." All of the foregoing 
statements by the trial court would lead us to believe that 
the testimony of Dr. Christensen was not admitted as evi-
dence. However, when the trial court made its finding that 
plaintiff was traveling at a rate of speed in excess of 60 
miles per hour, we must assume that the testimony of Dr. 
Christensen was considered. If such testimony was con-
sidered, we submit that it was prejudicial error hy the trial 
court to do so. 
The only basis upon which Dr. Christensen oould tes-
tify was by giving his opinion in response to the hypotheti-
cal question. Dr. Christensen was not an eye witness to 
the collision, he observed no skid marks relative to the 
-collision, and he never saw the defendant's truck, or pic-
tures of it, even before or after the eoHision (Tr. 256) . 
Although the question of whether a witness is qualified to 
give an opinion generally rests with discretion of the trial 
court, the record clearly shows that Dr. Christensen was 
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not qualified to give an opinion of the speed of plaintiff's 
automobile immediately prior to the collision. On voir 
dire examination he admitted that he had never before 
calculated speed of automobiles from skid marks involved 
in collisions (Tr. 242). He made some experiments on meas-
uring coefficient of friction, and did some experimentation 
in the theory of the subject (Tr. 242). He could not ex-
press an opinion on how quickly an automobile could stop 
under certain conditions, but could only testify as to the 
corresponding figure shown on the Utah Highway Patrol 
chart (Defendant's Exhibit 6, which strangely enough 
was admitted in evidence only to illustrate the testimony 
of the witness (Tr. 244, 245). The only qualifications 
shown was that the witness holds a degree of Doctor of 
Physics, (Tr. 241), has been a teacher of physics for 28 to 
30 years, and did some special work for the government in 
physics during the war from 1942 to 1946 (Tr. 243). We 
objected to his qualifications (Tr. 243). We submit that it 
was an abuse of discretion of the trial court to permit him 
to testify as an expert in the application of impact and mo-
mentum theories to automobiles. We strongly contend that 
the testimony of !Dr. Christensen insofar as it related to 
the speed of plaintiff's automobile was Wholly incompetent. 
There is some confusion among the adjudicated cases 
of the extent to which experts who are not eye witnesses 
to the collision may be permitted to give an opinion. Al-
though it is well settled in Utah that the use of tire marks 
of a skidding automobile is used as the basis for expert tes-
ti~mony (State v. Lingman, 97 Utah 180, 91 P. 2d 457), we 
have grave doubt about such rule being scientifically sound. 
In this connection we respectfully call the Court's atten-
tion to the excellent book entitled, "Tire Dynamics", by 
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Andrew J. White, First Edition, published by Motor Ve-
hicle Research, Inc., which is a comprehensive experimen-
tation in the field of tire marks and their relationship to 
vehicle velocity prior to brake application. On page 62 
thereof, the following statement is made: 
"The measurement of physical marks with a measuring 
tape is one method generally used by police and others 
in an effort to relate tire mark length to vehicle ve-
locity prior to brake application. While this method 
is an acceptable one for measurement, it accomplishes 
just one thing, namely the length of tire marks. When 
the information gathered is used in an attempt to es-
taJblish even the minimum speed, the vehicle must have 
been traveling, the number of variables involving road 
surface differentials, tires, atmospheric temperature, 
time of year and others, render almost any estima-
tion of speed invalid." 
The author then gives numerous reasons to support 
the foregoing statement. 
The case of State vs. Lingman, cited above, goes fur-
thur than any other case we have examined in permitting 
the expert testimony as to the speed of automobiles, based 
on a hypothetical question. We 'believe that the admoni-
tions expressed by Chief Justice Wolfe therein, are very 
pertinent to the case at bar. To begin with, in the Ling-
man case objections were raised to the qualifications of 
the expert, who was a professor in the Department of Me-
chanical Engineering at the University of Utah, and had 
been teaching there for over 35 years; whether this quali-
fied him was left up to the trial court. The professor tes-
tified that the loss of impact of bodies were applicable to 
automobiles, whereas in the instant case Dr. Christensen 
had nothing to say on this point. 
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.· Secondly, the witness (in the Lingman case) based 
his opmion on a formula which included only the purely 
physical facts of directions of the two cars, and their 
weights, the points of impact, the coefficient of restitution, 
the frictional resistance of the surface over which the 
struck car was pushed, and the distance of the sideward 
movement in the struck car. A comparison of the fac-
tors employed in the hypothetical question in the Lingman 
case with those of the instant case shows that the latter 
was so lacking in so many material physical facts that any 
opinion based thereon would ·be of no value whatsoever. 
For example, in the instant case, the question made no ref-
erence to the coefficient of restitution, although the wit-
ness assumed an elastic impact. The question made no 
mention of the speed or momentum of defendant's truck, 
and the witness did not take into consideration the speed 
of the truck (Tr. 250), although the truck was in motion 
at the time of impact (Tr. 27, 123). The witness assumed 
that all of the energy which propelled the defendant's truck 
was transferred from plaintiff's car (Tr. 255), yet there 
was no evidence to support such fact. The question did 
not take into consideration the manner in which the de-
fendant's truck ·whirled around, namely, whether the truck 
pivoted on its own rear wheels, and skidded only on the 
front wheels, or whether all four wheels skidded. The wit-
ness did not take into consideration the direction the truck 
moved after the impact (Tr. 262). The question did not 
take into consideration the nature of the surface of the 
ground over which the truck skidded. The question asked 
the witness to assume that ·the defendant's truck moved 
in a ·circular direction for 30 feet (Tr. 246), whereas the 
witness based his calculations on a total movement of 60 
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feet for the truck (Tr. 260). The question did not take 
into consideration whether the tire marks left by plain-
tiff's automobile resulted from a locked-wheels, or impen-
ding-skid phenomena, which is an important consideration. 
(See "Tire Dynamics" by Alfred J. White, pages 34, 35, 
and 38). The witness assumed that all four wheels were 
completely locked (Tr. 261), yet there is no evidence to 
support such fact. The question did not take into consid-
eration whether the tires on plaintiff's car were natural 
rubber or synthetic rubber, which is important since the 
co-efficient of friction for both are not the same. (See "Tire 
Dynamics", supra, page 151). There are numerous other 
material factors which were omitted from the hypothetical 
question that should be mentioned; however, in the inter-
est of brevity we shall not discuss them further. 
Referring back to the Lingman case, supra, on page 
462 of the Pacific Reports, this ·Court expressed some doubt 
as to whether the testimony in that case would 1be admis-
sible if there was an unreliable personal equation for which 
the experts could not make allowance, such as skill of the 
drivers and their reactions in an emergency, in addition to 
the unknown speed of one or both of the cars where that 
was of controlling importance (Citing cases including Blash-
field, Permanent Edition, Section 6312). It was then poin-
ted out that those unpredictable factors were of no sig-
nificance in that case under the hypothesis of the witness, 
since the skid marks of the pushed car showed only a di-
rect sideward movement with no twirling motion of the 
car from which it could be inferred that the factors of hu-
man reaction and momentum were of no significance. We 
wish to emphasize the fact that in the Lingman case, sup-
ra, there was no twirling motion of the struck car, whereas 
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in the instant case the trial court found that defendant's 
truck was knocked completely around (R. 37) . If such 
factor had existed in the Lingman case, supra, the opinion 
therein suggests that the result could well have been differ-
ent. On page 463 of the Pacific Reporter, it is stated: 
"We do not mean to state that in all cases of impact 
such evidence by experts as was here introduced is 
admissible. But under the physical circumstances of 
this case, as shown by the tire marks demonstrating 
that the car had been pushed sidewise and not twisted, 
the evidence was admissible." 
This Court then goes on to admonish the trial court 
and counsel to be very cautious in the use of opinion evi-
dence, and clearly states the rule as follows: 
"Experts may give answer to such questions both on 
theirown observations as a foundation, or on evidence 
adduced from other sources which may for the pur-
poses of the question be assumed as facts. (Citing 
cases). But experts cannot give an opinion on mat-
ters not observed by them, or not in evidence by the 
testimony of others. We have discussed with perhaps 
too much particularity the claimed ommision and in-
trusions of f.act claimed not to be in evidence. We 
do not consider it necessary to further discuss this 
question, save to advance the admonition that the 
Court and counsel should be careful to see that a hypo-
thetical question presents or assumes no fact that is 
not in evidence; that it does present all facts or ele-
ments necessary to the determination to be made by 
the witness, or to enable him properly to form an ex-
pert opinion; and that no material element or fact is 
used by the witness in his determination that is not 
presented in the question as asked." 
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Applying the foregoing rule to the facts of this case 
as shown by the record, and as discussed above, any opin-
ion as to the speed of plaintiff's automobile given by the 
witness, Dr. Christensen, is wholly incompetent. The con-
clusion is inescapable that it was error to permit Dr. Chris-
tensen to give his opinion of the speed of plaintiff's auto-
mobile. 
The record is devoid of any other evidence to support 
a finding that plaintiff was traveling at a rate of speed in 
excess of 60 miles per hour. The burden was upon defend-
ant to prove that plaintiff was speeding. Such a finding 
cannot be based on mere speculation or conjecture, but 
must be based on the preponderance of the evidence. (Al-
varado vs. Tucker, et al, 2 tJtah 2d 16, 268 P. 2d 986.) 
We submit that the· finding made by the trial court in this 
respect cannot stand, and is wholly unsupported by any 
competent evidence. 
POINT II 
THJERE IS NO COMPETENT EVIDENCE TO SUP-
PORT A FINDING THAT THE SPEED AT WHICH 
PLAINTIFF WAS TRAVELING WHEN DEFENDANT'S 
TRUCK MOVED ONTO THE HIGHWAY DIRECTLY IN 
FRONT OF PLAINTIFF CONTRIBUTED TO, OR WAS 
A PART OF, THE PRO,XIMATE CAUSE OF HER IN-
JURIES. 
Even if there were competent evidence to support a 
finding that plaintiff was traveling at a speed in excess 
of 60 miles per ·hour, theve still must be competent evi-
dence to support the finding that such excess of speed was 
the proximate cause of the collision. Alvarado vs. Tucker, 
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et al, 2 Utah 2d 216, 268 P. 2d 986. In the Alvarado case, 
a child darted out from behind a moving car into the path 
of defendant. The only contention made as to defendant's 
negligence was that defendant was speeding. The area 
was zoned for 25 miles per hour. An experienced police 
officer testified on cross examination that his opinion of the 
actual speed of defendant's car, based on tire skid marks, 
was 25 to 30 miles per hour. It was held that such evi-
dence would support a finding of a speed of only 25 miles 
per hour. On the subject of proximate cause, the court 
stated on page 988 of the Pacific Reporter as follows: 
"Even if the plaintiff were correct in hev contention 
that the evidence would justify a finding of 5 or 10 
miles per hour in excess of the speed limit, she would 
still be faced with the necessity of proving that such 
excess of speed was the proximate cause of the in-
jury. Under the facts here shown, that as the defend-
ant was proceeding southward, the plaintiff darted 
westward across the street and came out from behind 
the north bound car into defendant's course of travel. 
Nothing appears in the evidence, either directly or from 
reasonable inference, to indicate that he could have 
stopped in time to avoid striking plaintiff, even if he 
had been traveling only 25 miles per hour. In other 
words, from anything that appeared, the fact of such 
excess speed would not have made the difference be-
tween hitting or avoiding plaintiff." 
The fact that an automobile was going at an unlawful 
or e:xcessive speed, in violation of either common law rules 
or a statute or ordinance, at the time of the collision, does 
not constitute a bar for injuries sustained in the collision, 
if such violation was not a proximate cause of the acci-
dent. Stated in other words, the act of a motorist in driv-
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ing at an improper rate of speed at the time of a collision 
will not prevent his recovering for injuries from such col-
lision, if the accident would have happened if his speed had 
been proper. Blashfield Cyclopedia of Automobile Law 
and Practice, Section 2611. 
In the instant case, the trial court found that the 
plaintiff's car and the Holbrook ear passed each other go-
ing in opposite directions at approximately 75 to 100 feet 
north of Shumway Road (R. 36). Plaintiff testified that 
she was 50 to 75 feet from the Shumway Road, and that 
she was even with the Holbrook ear when she first rea-
lized defendant was going to morve onto the highway in 
front of her (Tr. 27, 40). This testimony is corroborated 
by the testimony of Elliott Johnson, who stated that de-
fendant's truck began to move onto the highway just as 
the Ho}brook car passed the intersection (Tr. 124, 125), at 
which time plaintiff's car and the HJolbrook car were very 
close together (Tr. 135), or very near parallel (Tr. 136). 
Assuming that the plaintiff was traveling at a speed 
of 50 miles per hour, or 74 feet per second, in point of time 
only 1 to 1.35 seconds of time would elapse in clos.ing the 
respective distances of 75 feet to 100 feet. The reaction 
time for an average person as shown by table 4 on defend-
ant's Exhibit N·umber 6, is 3,4 second, during which inter-
val a car moving at a speed of 50 miles per hour would 
travel a distance of 55 feet. Deducting the reaction time, 
there would remain from .25 to .60 secornd of time within 
which to stop plaintiff's car after the :brake pedal had been 
depressed, or in terms of distance from 20 feet to 45 feet. 
The respective time intervals and distances would propor-
tionately decrease if it were assumed that plaintiff was trav-
eling at a speed in excess of HO miles per hOW'. It would 
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appear from table four of defendant's Exhibit Number 
6, that it would take an average driver a distance of 100 
feet to stop an average automobile traveling at a speed of 
35 miles per hour on good pavement from the instant he 
observes the danger. Applying the foregoing to the instant 
case, it is apparent that if plaintiff were traveling at a 
rate of 35 miles per hour at the instant she observed de-
fendant's truck move onto the highway, it would have 
taken 100 feet to stop her automobile, and the collision still 
would have occurred. Likewise, if the distance were 75 
feet her speed could have been slightly less than 30 miles 
per hour, and the collision still would have occurred. 
It is obvious from the foregoing that when defendant 
moved onto the highway in front of plaintiff at the instant 
plaintiff was 75 to 100 feet away, the collision would have 
occurred regardless of whether the speed of plaintiff's au-
tomolbile was in excess of 60 miles per hour, 50 miles per 
hour, 35 miles per hour, or possibly 30 miles per hour. Un-
der the rules set forth in Blashfield, and the case of Al-
varado vs. Tucker, et al, cited above, we are at a loss to 
understand upon what evidence the trial court could find 
and conclude that the speed of plaintiff's automobile was 
a proximate cause of the collision. We submit that no such 
evidence exists in the record. Such a finding cannot stand 
when there is no competent evidence to support it. 
POINT Ill 
THERE IS NO COMPETENT EVIDENCE TO SUP-
PORT A FINDING THAT THE S·PEED AT WHICH 
PUAINTIFF WAS TRAVELING AT THE TIME DE-
FENDANT DROVE ONTO HIGHWAY 89, INTO THE 
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PATH OF PLAINTIFF'S CAR, WAS NOT REASONABLE 
OR PRUDENT UNDER THE EXISTING CIRCUMSTAN-
CES. 
U. S. Highway 89 is an arterial highway between the 
cities of Ephraim and Manti, Utah (R. 35). The posted 
speed limit along the foregoing section of highway is, and 
was, at the time of the collision, 60 miles per hour (Tr. 
98). Section 41-6-46, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, fixes the 
speed limit on the highways of this state, and highway 89 
in the area in question falls within subdivision 41-6-46(b) 
(3), which is fixed at 60 miles per hour. This statute re-
quires that a driver shall not drive at a speed greater than 
is reasonable in view of the existing conditions and haz-
ards on the highway; that his speed shall be controlled so as 
to avoid colliding with other vehicles entering upon the 
highway in a lawful manner, and that the speed shall be 
appropriately reduced when special hazards exist with re-
spect to other traffic, or by reason of weather conditions. 
Horsley vs. Robinson, 112 Utah 227, 186 P. 2d 592. There 
can be no question about the fact that the -conduct of de-
fendant in driving onto the highway directly into the path 
of plaintiff's automobile when she was 75 to 100 feet north 
of defendant, was unlawful. 
Plaintiff was driving her automobile south on high-
way 89, at a speed of approximately 50 to 52 miles per 
hour (Tr. 23, 75). When she was between 1000 and 900 
feet north of the junction of Shumway Road, she observed 
defendant's truck proceeding east on Shumway Road (R. 
36) . She decreased her speed until she observed defend-
ant's truck stop near the west edge of the paved portion 
of Hlighway 89, at which time she was approximately 400 
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to 500 feet north of defendant's stopped truck (Tr. 57, 58). 
After plaintiff observed defendant's truck stop, she as-
sumed that defendant was going to yield to her right of 
way, and she then increased her speed to approximately 
50 miles per hour (Tr. 69). When plaintiff was 75 to 100 
feet north of the entrance of Shumway Road (R. 36, Tr. 
27), defendant drove his truck into the highway directly 
into the path of plaintiff (Tr. 27). The speed of plaintiff's 
automobile prior to the collision, was 50 miles per hour 
(Tr. 69). 
Plaintiff had the right to assume that defendant would 
not drive negligently. When defendant stopped his truck 
before entering upon the highway, plaintiff assumed and 
had the right to rely on the fact that defendant was going 
to, and would, yield to her right of way. Such is the hold-
ing of the case of Keir vs. Trager, et al, 134 Kansas 505, 
7 P. 2d 49. In that case the Kansas Court held that plain-
tiff, who was the favored driver, relied on the fact that 
defndant, who was entering the intersection from a secon-
dary road controllod by a stop sign, was going to stop. 
The defendant failed to stop, and a collision occurred. On 
page 50 of the Pacific Reporter, the Kansas Court stated: 
"The law is well established that the operator of an 
automobile on a public highway may assume that oth-
ers using the highway will observe the law of the road 
and is not guilty of contributory negligence in acting 
upon such assumption, unless and until he has knowl-
edge to the contrary. (Citing eases). 
"The appellee (plaintiff) was wholly within her rights 
in assuming that the appellant (defendant) would stop 
before entering the highway, and she cannot be charged 
with negligence in acting upon such assumption. She 
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can only be charged with negligence under such cir-
cumstances from the time that she had knowledge that 
the defendant intended to disobey stop sign and enter 
upon the highway. After she had such knowledge, she 
was bound to use the care of an ordinary, prudent per-
son." 
The foregoing rule has also been adopted in Utah, and 
is finnly esta;blished by expressions of this Court. The 
case of Hess vs. Robinson, 109 Utah 60, 163 P. 2d 510, in-
volved a situation where the plaintiff, who was driving along 
a through street, collided with an ambulance which had 
entered an intersection against a stop sign. Plaintiff failed 
to look to the right to see the ambulance approaching. In 
the majority opinion, it was pointed out that the jury could 
well find it to 'be within plaintiff's duty of due care to as-
sume that the driver of the ambulance would obey the stop 
sign, and that he was entitled to proceed through the inter-
section until it became apparent to him that the ambu-
lance would not stop. In the case of Lowder vs. Holley, 120 
Utah 231, 233 P. 2d 350, where plaintiff failed to see de-
fendant approaching the intersection from the right, it was 
pointed out that even if the plaintiff had seen defendant, 
it could be found to be within his duty of care to assume 
that defendant would yield him the right of way. In Mar-
tin vs. Stevens, 121 Utah 484, 243 P. 2d 747, this Couvt 
stated, on page 751 of the Pacific Reporter, as follows: 
''Although plaintiff had the right of way under both 
rules above referred to, yet there devolved upon him 
the duty of care in observing for otheT traffic, but in 
doing so he had the right to assume, and to rely and 
act on the assumption that others would do likewise; 
he was not obliged to anticipate either that other driv .. 
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ers would drive negligently, nor fail to accord him his 
right of way, until in the exercise of due care, he ob-
served, or should have observed, something to warn 
him that the other driver was driving negligently or 
would fail to accord him his right of way. If this prin-
ciple is not clear in the earlier Utah cases, it is finnly 
established by the more recent expressions of this 
c·ourt.'' 
To the same effect is the case of Bates vs. Burns, 3 Utah 
2d 180, 281 P. 2d 209. 
The duty of care imposed upon the driver of an ar-
terial highway is very clearly set forth in the case of Botts 
vs. Rushton, 63 Nevada 426, 172 P. 2d 147. On page 153 
of the Pacific Reporter it is stated: 
"A driver on a through or arterial highway who is driv-
ing at lawful speed and in a lawful manner has the 
right of way at an intersection with a secondary stop 
sign highway, and is entitled to assume that a driver 
on the latter will obey the law until the contrary ap-
pears, or should appear to a reasonable man in his 
position. If the favored driver, keeping a careful look 
out as he approaches or enters the intersection, sees 
or becomes aware of anything indicating that the dri-
ver on the secondary highway does not intend to yield 
the right of way, he is bound to use the care of an 
ordinarily prudent person in endeavoring to avoid an 
accident. If the driver on the favored highway is him-
self free from negligence in approaching the intersec-
tion, he has the right to presume that the driver on the 
disfavored highway will yield the right of way to him 
and not proceed into the intersections until he can do 
so without creating a traffic hazard. The purpose of 
arterial highways is to facilitate through traffic, af-
ford rapid transit, and permit vehicles thereon to move 
freely, thus accelerating the flow of traffic over such 
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favored highways. As a general rule it is not neces-
sary for such drivers on such highways to stop or slow 
up as they reach a stop sign intersection highway, in 
order to ascertain whether or not the driver on the 
latter is going to stop and yield the right of way. The 
right of way enjoyed by the driver on the favored high-
way does not relieve him of the duty to keep a careful 
lookout so that he may observe whether the driver 
on the disfavored highway is going to yield the right 
of way; but he is not obliged to have his car under such 
control at an intersection stop sign highway that he 
may stop at once and so avoid collision with pe·rsons 
who may illegally come into his path. If a driver on a 
trunk line is proceeding in a lawful manner, there is 
no rule which requires him to keep his car under such 
control as to be able to stop within a given number of 
feet." 
In the instant case, after defendant stopped, he did not 
move again until after the Holbrook car had passed him 
(Tr. 123, 286). The ·evidence conclusively shows that de-
fendant did northing to put plaintiff on notice that he was 
not going to yield to plaintiff her right of way until plain-
tiff was approximately 75 to 100 feet from the Shumway 
Road, and in point of time approximately 1 second away. 
As soon as plaintiff observed that defendant started to 
drive onto the highway she immediately applied her brakes 
(Tr. 27). This is substantiated by the tire braking marks 
which began from 41 to 45 feet north of the point of im-
pact (R. 36) coupled with her reaction time. It was im-
possible for plaintiff to turn into the north bound lane since 
the Holbrook car was abreast of plaintiff's car at that in-
stant, and was followed by a heavily loaded truck driven 
by Elliott Johnson (R. 36). 
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A similar fact situation existed in the case of Guegel 
vs. Bailey, 199 Oklahoma 441, 186 P. 2d 827, wherein de-
fendant was driving west on a through highway. Deceased 
was driving south on a secondary road upon which there 
existed a stop sign. After deceased had stopped, or slowed 
down, he drove onto the highway in front of defendant's 
car. Defendant applied her brakes as soon as she could, 
but coHided with deceased's car. On page 828 of the Pa-
cific Reporter the Supreme Court of Oklahoma stated that: 
"In the instant case, the deceased drove from !behind 
a bus onto Tenth Street in front of defendant's car. 
From that time on, defendant was required to act as 
a reasonably prudent person would have acted under 
such circumstances. The application of this rule would 
determine whether or not she was negligent, not the 
statute." 
We are mindful of the fact that under the authorities 
cited above, the question of whether plaintiff's speed was 
reasonable is a question of fact to be determined by the 
trial court when sitting without a jury. We assume that the 
finding of the trial court that a speed at which plaintiff 
was driving was not prudent or reasonable under the exist-
ing circumstances, was based upon its erroneous finding 
that plaintiff was traveling at a speed in excess of 60 miles 
per hour. For the reason stated under point No. 1, there 
was no competent evidence to support a finding that plain-
tiff was traveling in excess of 50 to 52 miles per hour im-
mediately prior to the collision. The issue involved herein 
then becomes whether or not reasonable minds could dif-
fer as to whether plaintiff's speed of between 50 to 52 miles 
per hour was not reasonable and prudent under existing 
circumstances. We emphasize the fact that the speed at 
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which plaintiff was driving was well under the statutory 
posted 60 mile per hour limit. We believe that under the 
test and standards set forth in the authorities cited above, 
that reasoruuble minds could reach only the conclusion that 
plaintiff's speed was reasonable and prudent under the ex-
isting circumstances. It would be an unwise rule of law 
to require a driver on an arterial highway to slow down 
at the junction of every county lane, sideroad and eounty 
road in antieipation that a driver thereon might nort obey 
the law, and enter onto the highway at any time even when 
the favored driver was within a hazardous distance. The 
concurring opinion of Chief Justice Wolfe in the case of 
Poulson vs, Manness, 121 Utah 269, 241 P. 2d 152, sup-
ports this view. On page 155 of the Pacific Reporter Chief 
Justice Wolfe stated: 
"The instant case falls within a category which should 
he denominated a highway case. Here maximum law-
ful speed is permitted on the oiled highway and it ap-
pears undisputed that there was a duty upon the plain-
tiff to stop before attempting to er.oss the highway. 
This situation we must expect the reasonable prudent 
person to look greater distances in order to ascertain 
that he can cross with safety. The speed of oncoming 
traffic being greater, the time for appraisement and 
decision must necessarily ;be shorter. This, of ·course, 
every motorist realizes. 
"Another way of stating it is that a motorist driving 
on a fast arterial highway need not treat every country 
lane or relatively ·minor sideroad as an intersection. 
He has the right of way .for a much greater distance." 
It would be even a more harsh rule of law to require 
a driver on an arterial highway when he observed that a 
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driver on a· secondary road has stopped before entering 
the highway, to slow down to such a speed that will en-
able the favored driver to stop and avoid a collision in the 
event the disfavored driver decided to drive onto the high-
way at any instant he desires. Either of the rules would 
defeat the very purpose of the arterial highway, and would 
impede and obstruct traffic thereon, rather than facilitate 
the movement of such traffic. The only conclusion which 
would be reached from an application of either rule is well 
started by Mr. Justice Crockett in the majority opinion in 
the case of Martin vs. Stevens, cited above. On page 750 
of the Pacific Reporter he states: 
"If a driver has to drive his car under the assumption 
that everyone else is apt to be negligent, the next step 
would be for him to conclude that he better get off 
the streets entirely or someone is likely to hit him, 
and abandon the streets to those who were just willing 
to take chances. If, under circumstances such as pres-
ent in this case, where the plaintiff's right of way is 
so clear that no reasonable person could have any 
doubt about it, he could not assume that he would be 
afforded his right of way, the only way drivers could 
safely proceed at an intersection would be to resort 
to: 'you first, my dear Gaston, - No, after you, my 
dear Alphonse,' procedure, or get out and hold a con-
ference before either could safely proceed." 
We submit that the plaintiff's speed under the exist-
ing circumstances was reasonable and prudent and under 
the record of this case reasonable minds could not differ. 
We further submit that there was no competent evidence 
to support a finding that the speed at which plaintiff was 
driving was not reasonable and prudent under the exist-
ing conditions. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
27 
POINT IV 
THERE IS NO COMPETE.NT EVID,ENCE TO SUP-
PORT A FINDING THAT PLAINTIFF FAILED TO 
KEEP A PROPER LOOKOUT, OR THAT PLAINTIFF 
WAS NEGLIGENT IN ANY MANNER. 
The trial court made findings that plaintiff did not 
observe that defendant was not looking to the north, or 
that his attention was focused on the HoJbrook car ap-
proaching from the south, and plaintiff did not sound her 
horn (R. 37). Plaintiff first observed defendant's truck 
traveling east on Shumway Road when plaintiff was be-
tween 1000 and 900 feet north of Shumway Road (R. 36). 
Plaintiff kept defendant's truck in view at all times from 
the time she first observed it until it stopped, at which 
time plaintiff was 400 feet to 500 feet north of Shumway 
Road (Tr. 57, 48 R. 36). After defendant stopped he did 
nothing that plaintiff observed, except remain stopped, 
until he drove his truck onto the highway directly into the 
path of plaintiff (Tr. 27). Plaintiff observed someone, 
(defendant), in defendant's truck when it stopped, but she 
was unable to tell in which direction he was looking (Tr. 
39, 40). Plaintiff saw defendant's truck mo¥e the instant 
it began to move forward onto the highway (Tr. 39). Dur-
ing all times mentioned cubove neither the view of the plain-
tiff, nor the view of the defendant was obstructed of each 
other (R. 36). 
We are at a loss to understand how the trial court 
could find that plaintiff had a duty to observe that defend-
ant did not look to the north before driving onto the high-
way, when plaintiff, in seeing the defendant in his truck, 
couldn't tell in which direction defendant was loo~. 
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Surely the defendant could have glanced to the north with 
a quick movement of his head, or even just with his eyes 
with no movement of his head, and it would have been vir-
tually impossible for plaintiff to see such movement. It 
must be remembered that plaintiff had to keep her atten-
tion focused on the road ahead, the Holbrook car which 
was then approaching from the south, and the defendant's 
truck. Yet, the trial court found it plaintiff's duty to look 
into the ca:b of defendant's truck and observe that defend-
ant did not look to the north. Defendant had the duty to 
look to the north and observe plaintiff's car approaching. 
Plaintiff had the right to assume that defendant did look, 
and she could not be held contributorily negligent for re-
lying on that assumption. This is true particularly in view 
of the fact that defendant had stopped and plaintiff as-
sumed that defendant was going to yield to her right of 
way. We believe the foregoing comes within the spirit and 
very purpose of the principles set forth in Martin vs. Ste-
vens, 121 Utah 484, 243 P. 2d 747, as discussed above. 
We have been unable to find any case where the duty 
was imposed upon the favored driver on the arterial high-
way to observe that the disfavored driver entering the 
highway from a secondary road had not looked in the di-
rection of the favored driver. Such a duty is so contrary 
to common sense and reason, and it would place such a 
hopeless burden on any driver, that it doesn't warrant any 
further argument. 
There is no dispute about the finding that plaintiff 
did nort sound the horn of her automobile as she approached 
Shumway Road (R. 37, Tr. 87). In view of what we have 
said above, we do not believe that there devolved upon the 
plaintiff any duty to so do. If it were so determined, as 
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the trial court found, that plaintiff had a duty to observe 
that defendant did not look to the north, we can see reason 
for imposing the duty to sound her horn. In such event, 
since plaintiff would be on notice that defendant did not 
see her and might proceed onto the highway, the trier of 
the fact could well find that plaintiff should have sounded 
her horn. Such a duty could well be imposed under Sec-
tion 41-6-146, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, which provides 
in part that the driver of a motor vehicle shall, when rea-
sonably necessary to insure safe operation, give audilble 
warning with his horn, burt shall not otherwise use such 
horn upon the highway. If, however, plaintiff did not have 
the duty to observe that defendant had nort looked in her 
direction, plaintiff did nort have the duty to sound her horn 
under the foregoing statute. Since we are convinced that 
plaintiff had no such duty to observe, we contend she had 
no duty to sound her horn. 
The duty of care required in the instant case is the 
duty imposed upon the driver on an arterial highway, who 
is confronted with secondary roads controlled by stop signs. 
Since this is an arterial highway case, the facts are some-
what similar to Poulsen vs. Manness, 121 Utah 269, 241 P. 
2d 152, which involved a coHision at the intersection at an 
arterial highway with a county road. In the instant case 
we have the additional fact that the county road was con-
trolled by a stop sign, whereas in the Poulsen case the 
county road therein was uncontrolled. In the Poulsen case 
Chief Justice Wolfe in his concurring opinion, on page 155 
of the Pacific Reporter, pointed out: 
"The city intersection collision is usually under ·circum-
stances quite different from those of this case. This 
·case is unlike Bullock vs. Luke, 98 Utah 501, 98 P. 2d 
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350; Hickok vs. Skinner 113 Utah 1, 190 P. 2d, 514; 
Conklin vs. Walsh 113 Utah 276, 193 P. 2d 437; Gren 
vs. Norton, Utah 213 P. 2d 356. It is different from 
Mingus vs. Olsson, Utah, 201 P. 2d 495, although there 
may be some broad principles of law stated in those 
cases appUcable to intersection or for that matter 
any automobile collision case. It is the factual differ-
ences which arise out of human conduct that give birth 
to refinements in cases which differentiate them. 
"This case differs materially from Hess vs. Robinson, 
109 Utah 60, 163 P. 2d, 510. True, it is assimilable to 
Lowder vs. Holley, Utah, 1951, 233 P. 2d, 350, 353, 
except in that case two county roads intersected; not 
a country road with a speed inviting highway. This 
situation may come up more often in the future as cars 
emerge from country lanes or secondary roads onto 
through and cross-continental highways where great 
disparity of speed may be the usual thing which on 
the roads intersecting in the case of Lowder vs. Holley, 
supra, was not expectable . . . . . ". 
This case is also distinguishable from the cases of Sine 
vs. Salt Lake Transportation Company, 106 Utah 289, 147 
P. 2d 875·; Hickok vs. Skinner, 113 Utah 1, 190 P. 2d 514; 
Conklin vs. Walsh, 113 Utah 276, 193 P. 2d, 437, and Gren 
vs. Norton, 117 Urtah 121, 213 P. 2d 356, where the driver 
was held guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of 
law. Each of those cases was decided upon the proposi-
tion that the circumstances were such that the driver held 
to be negligent as a matter of law either observed, or in 
the exercice of due care should have observed the manner 
in which the other driver was approaching the intersection, 
and clearly could by ordinary reasonable care have avoided 
the ·collision. In each of those cases, the negligence of the 
driver was so clear that a reasonable mind could not find 
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to the contrary. 
In referring to the foregoing cases in the case of Mar-
tin vs. Stevens cited above, on page 751, this Court stated 
as follows: 
"There has been, and still is much discussion and dis-
agreement as to whether the various fact situations 
in those cases come under the foregoing rule. But 
there is no disagreement about the rule. If as stated 
by Chief Justice Wolfe in his concurring opinion the 
facts of Hickok vs. Skinner, supra, do not bring it 
within the principle above stated, it was wrongly d~ 
cided, and is hereby overruled. Those cases do not 
purport to lay down any other standard than that of 
ordinary r-easonable care. No matter how far afield 
one may go in reviewing, analyzing and rationalizing 
the decisions in these intersection cases, he must always 
come back to the one basic concept that underlies and 
controls the Law of Torts: the conduct of the mythioal 
but extremely useful 'ordinary, reasonable, prudent 
man under the circumstances,' all of which is encom-
passed in the shorter phrase, 'due care'." 
We submit that the conduct of plaintiff from the time 
she first observed defendant's truck until the collision oc-
curred was all that could be expected of the ordinary rea-
sonable, prudent man. The record overwhelmingly shows 
that she maintained a proper lookout. Plaintiff kept the 
defendant's truck in her view until it stopped. She ob-
served the truck the instant it began moving forward onto 
the highway. She immediately applied her brakes, but it 
was too late to avoid the coUision. Under the standards 
and principles set forth in the authorities cited herein, and 
based upon the record in this case, reasonable minds could 
not differ in reaching the conclusion that plaintiff was free 
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from negligence. There is no evidence to support a find-
ing otherwise. 
CONCLUSION 
The record is devoid of any competent evidence to sup-
port the finding of the trial court that plaintiff was traveling 
at a speed in excess of 50 to 52 miles per hour immediately 
prior to the collision. Plaintiff unequivocally testified that 
her speed was 50 to 52 miles per hour. This was corrobo-
rated by the testimony of Wallace Tatton. The testimony 
of the witness Etta Johnson of the distances involved was 
so exaggerated and misjudged that any inference of the 
speed of plaintiff's automobile based thereon was mere 
speculation and conjecture. Any finding based upon such 
evidence cannot stand. The opinion testimony of Dr. Chris-
tensen, relating to the speed of plaintiff's automobile, if 
it were admitted, is wholly incompetent. 'Dr. Christensen 
was not qualified to testify as an expert on the application 
of impact and momentum theories to automobiles. The 
hypothetical question posed to him lacked numerous ma-
terial factors, and included material factors not in evidence. 
In addition thereto, the evidence shows the existence of 
material factors for which no scientific formula could be 
applied. Any opinion based thereon would not be entitled 
to any weight whatsoever. The record is void of any other 
evidence which would support a finding that the speed of 
plaintiff's automobile was greater than 50 to 52 miles per 
hour. 
Under the facts of this case the speed of plaintiffs 
automobile was not a proximate cause of the collision. It 
is immaterial whether the plaintiff was traveling in excess 
of 60 miles per hour or 30 miles per hour, since the collision 
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would have occurred anyway. The difference would have 
been only a matter of degree and not the difference of 
whether the collision would have occurred. It was incum-
bent upon the defendant to show that even if plaintiff's 
speed was excessive that such excessive speed was a proxi-
mate cause of the collision. There simply is no evidence 
to support such a finding. Approximately one second of 
time elapsed between the time defendant started to drive 
forward, into plaintiff's path and the collision. The collision 
would have occurred even if plaintiff were traveling 30 to 
35 miles per hour. 
Plaintiff was the favored driver on an arterial high-
way. The evidence shows that her speed was between 50 
and 52 miles per hour, which was well under the statutory 
posted speed limit of 60 miles per hour. She slowed her 
automobile down until she observed that defendant's truck 
had stopped. When she saw the defendant stop, ,she as-
sumed that defendant was going to yield to her right of 
way. She cannot be held negligent for relying on such 
assumption. She then resumed her normal speed of ap-
proximately 50 miles per hour. To impose a duty upon the 
favored driver on an arterial highway to anticipate that 
a driver who is stopped at a controlled secondary road may 
pull onto the highway at any instant and require the said 
favored driver to so manage his automobile to avoid a col-
lision in such event would impose a hopeless burden on any 
driver, and would obstruct and impede the flow of traffic 
on our highways rather than facilitate it. 
The record shows that the conduct of plaintiff as a 
favored driver on an arterial highway was reasonable and 
prudent under the existing conditions. Plaintiff had no 
duty to observe that defendant did not look in her direc-
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tion, and likewise no duty to sound her horn. Plaintiff 
maintained a sharp lookout, and her conduct was all that 
could be expected of a reasonable prudent person. Under 
the tests and standards laid down by this Court in the ar-
terial highway-secondary road cases, reasonable minds 
could reach only the conclusion that plaintiff was free from 
negligence. 
We have no doubt that defendant was negligent and 
that there is substantial competent evidence to support the 
findings of the trial court that defendant was negligent, 
and that his negligence was the proximate cause of the col-
lision. Since appellant appeals only from the judgment 
of the trial court denying appellant's right of recovery, we 
have refrained from discussing the negligence of the defend-
ant in this brief. We do not anticipate that respondent will 
raise any question in his brief with respect thereto. In the 
event he does, we may desire to file a reply brief herein. 
We respectfully submit that the judgment of the trial 
court denying appellant's right of recovery should be re-
versed, and that the case should 'be remanded to the trial 
court with instructions to assess appellant's damages and 
enter judgment thereon. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PHiuLIP V. CHRISTENSON 
JOSEJPH NOVAK 
for CHRISTENSON, NOVAK & 
PAULSON, 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellant 
55 East Center, Provo, Utah 
STERLING R. BOSSARD 
Attorney for Plaintiff and Appellant 
Richfield, Utah 
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